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In his target article, McAdams brings together three 
domains in the field of psychology in which challenging 
developments have been observed over the past dec- 
ades: trait psychology, narrative psychology, and cul- 
ture. Trait psychology has been rejuvenated by cross- 
national and cross-cultural research projects on the "Big 
Five." The narrative approach has cropped up in a great 
diversity of psychological subdisciplines, including 
personality psychology, and is on its way to being 
accepted as a respected development in academic psy- 
chology. The notion of culture has also received enor- 
mous interest, particularly in discussions around mod- 
ernity and postmodernity and their implications for 
psychology as a science. Scientists in and outside psy- 
chology are becoming aware that culture is implicit not 
only in their personal views, but also in the theories and 
concepts that form the basis of their professional activi- 
ties. McAdams's contribution has the merit that it pro- 
vides an intriguing conceptual framework that aims at 
integrating a diversity of psychological developments 
that interact in many ways, but that have never been 
analyzed on their mutual implications from a 
metatheoretical point of view. 
Centrifugal Versus Centripetal Forces 
in Psychology 
To underscore the relevance and prospect of 
McAdams's proposal, it may be clarifying to locate his 
contribution in the context of the history of psychology 
as a discipline. As Altman (1987) proposed, a distinc- 
tion can be made between centripetal forces (working 
toward unity and integration) and centrifugal forces 
(working toward differentiation and specialization). In 
every period in the history of psychology, centrifugal 
and centripetal forces have been present simultane- 
ously. Despite this simultaneity, Altman argued that 
there are many indications that they are also alternately 
dominant in successive periods. He distinguished three 
periods: (a) the pre-1900 period, which was primarily 
centrifugal; (b) the period from 1900 to 1960, in which 
centripetal forces were at work; and (c) the period from 
1960 to the present, in which centrifugal forces are 
predominant. 
Altman (1987) observed strong centrifugal trends in 
psychological studies in the pre- 1900 period. The main 
reason was that early scholars of psychology were often 
to be found in various disciplines, such as philosophy, 
medicine, biology, or with no discipline at all. In that 
time there were no psychology departments, and early 
scholars explored psychological phenomena in an inde- 
pendent and noninstitutional fashion. As a conse- 
quence, there was little sense of a defined field of 
psychology with common values, methods, and ap- 
proaches. 
At the beginning of the second period, a variety of 
theoretical views manifested themselves as competing 
paradigms in the field of psychology, such as structu- 
ralism, functionalism, instinct theory, gestalt ap- 
proaches, and behaviorism. Eventually, the behaviorist 
perspective, in its variants, became most dominant in 
American psychology. Although there were many dif- 
ferences among these variants, they collectively pro- 
vided a unifying, centripetal anchor for psychology in 
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those years (e.g., theories of Watson, Hull, Tolman, and 
Skinner). In this period, nonbehaviorist theories also 
emerged as unifying theories, such as the field theory 
of Lewin, and the personality approaches of Murray and 
Allport. Altogether, "grand theories" were increasingly 
centripetal ar~d fulfilled the needs for structure and 
integration for many psychologists. 
In the third period, from 1960 onward, Altman 
(1987) observed that systems of education expanded 
and universities entered a phase of differentiation re- 
sulting in many disciplines and subdisciplines. Psychol- 
ogy departments became increasingly focused on their 
own development and excellence was usually measured 
by research productivity, publications, grant funds, and 
national visibility. More and more seminars were of- 
fered on narrower topics, and there was a premium on 
specialization. This proliferation of specialties, and the 
emergence of interest groups, functioned as a strong 
centrifugal force that led to the loss of a common core 
of ideas in psychology as an integrative discipline. 
In comparing the two forces, Altman (1987) explic- 
itly emphasize:d that he does not consider one of the two 
forces as "bea.er" than the other: 
I must reiterate that neither centrifugal nor centripetal 
trends are in%rinsically "good" or "bad." One can praise 
or decry centripetal trends, for example, as reflecting 
status quo and stagnation on the negative side, orunity, 
harmony, and stability on the positive side. Similarly, 
centrifugal trends can be viewed negatively, for exam- 
ple, as indicating divisiveness and disunity, or posi- 
tively, for enampie, as allowing for enrichment and 
exploration of new directions . . . we should not evalu- 
ate either trend as intrinsically good or bad. Rather we 
should attempt to assess their respective strengths, 
directions, and characteristics in order to adjust to and 
capitalize on their qualities. (pp. 1062-1063) 
In a similar vein, McAdams compares "grand theo- 
ries" (e.g., Freud, Lewin, and Murray) in the first half 
of this century with the empirical work on psychologi- 
cal constructs (e.g., need for achievement, self-rnoni- 
toring) by contemporary researchers in personality psy- 
chology. He evaluates both developments on their 
relative strength instead of rejecting one in favor of the 
other. He criticizes, for example, the grand theories for 
being "too general and ambiguous" but, at the same 
time, emphasizes the integrative potential of such en- 
deavors. On the other hand, he criticizes the fragmented 
picture of personality, resulting from research on "pet 
variables" by contemporary personality researchers, 
but he values their empirical and methodological con- 
tributions to the field. I consider McAdams's new inte- 
grative framework to be a bold attempt to keep the 
integrative power of more comprehensive theorizing 
while avoiding the pitfalls of overgenerality and being 
out of touch with empirical work on specific psycho- 
logical constructs. 
From the perspective of historical developments in 
psychology, I see McAdams's proposal as representing 
the beginning of a new centripetal period in psychology, 
one that is reacting to the fragmented picture of person- 
ality psychology of the postwar period. The difference 
with the period of the grand theories, however, is that 
his proposal is situated on a medium level of compre- 
hensiveness and generality. Constructing a theoretical 
framework on this level has the advantage that it is 
sufficiently in touch with empirical work on specific 
psychological constructs and, at the same time, profits 
from a broader, integrative view. 
In the following, I analyze and critically discuss 
three aspects of McAdams's proposal: (a) the combina- 
tion of contextualized and decontextualized elements in 
one conceptual framework; (b) integration as an intrin- 
sic feature of story; and (c) the distinction between 
narrative and postnarrative eras in human life. 
The Combination of Contextualized 
and Decontextualized Elements 
The proposed framework aims to combine and inte- 
grate contextualized and decontextualized elements in 
a three-level model. The first level refers to decontex- 
tualized elements (traits), whereas the second and third 
level represent contextualized elements: personal con- 
cerns and unity of life, respectively. How can decontex- 
tualized elements combine with contextualized ele- 
ments? McAdarns seems to be aware that there is a 
problem, when he describes the differences between 
Level 1 constructs and the notions on the other levels. 
He argues that trait descriptions yield little beyond a 
"psychology of a stranger7'-that is, as reliable and 
valid trait ratings they may provide a very useful "first 
read" on a person. Such information is characterized as 
comparative and relatively nonconditional. A highly 
extraverted person, for example, acts in an outgoing and 
sociable way compared to most other people (compara- 
tive) and tends to act in quite a wide variety of situations 
(nonconditional). How can data of this kind become 
meaningfully related to the personal concerns on Level 
2 and unity of life on Level 3, which are typically 
noncomparative and highly conditional and can only 
become wdl u.&er&oad in the cantext: sf  the person's. 
life situatiiorr? 
The problem of combining eontexmalized and de- 
contextualized elements becomes even more articulated 
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by McAdams's disagreement with McCrae and Costa's 
proposal that contextualized constructs like goals and 
strivings may be viewed as "characteristic adaptations" 
that are derived from the interaction of basic traits and 
environmental contingencies. In his contra-argumenta- 
tion, McAdams refers to work from Kaiser and Ozer, 
who found that personal goals ("motivational units") do 
not map into the five-factor structure. Instead, this study 
suggests that the structure of personal concerns may be 
more appropriately conceptualized in terms of various 
content domains (e.g., work, social). In other words, 
McAdams is aware that there is a problem with inte- 
grating the decontextualized Big Five on Level 1 with 
the contextualized data on the other levels. How then 
are the levels related and integrated? 
Within the constraints of the proposed conceptual 
framework, the integration of the different levels should 
derive from the selfing process. In McAdams's terms: 
In personality, the I may be viewed as the process of 
"selfing," of narrating experience to create a self, and 
the Me may be viewed as the self that the I narrates. The 
three levels hold a wide assortment of personal charac- 
teristics that are, in principle, potential components of 
the self-that is, potential characteristics of the Me that 
the I constructs. 
In other words, any aspect of personality, concern, 
or story may, in principle, be a potential part of the self, 
and the person may make it "mine" through selfing. 
Again, McAdams is aware of the problem that is created 
by this theoretical construction. He adds that personal- 
ity is not synonymous with the self-concept because (a) 
some parts of the Me are not aspects of personality (e.g., 
my dog, my clothing); and (b) some parts of personality 
may not be the targets of selfing, even though in prin- 
ciple they could be (e.g., unconscious material). How- 
ever, the problem may be more profound than 
McAdams is suggesting here. 
The following question has to be answered. When it 
is explicitly stated that "the Me is the primary product 
of the selfing process. It is the self that selfing makes," 
how then can decontextualized traits, which are not the 
product of selfing, be part of the Me that is, from a 
theoretical perspective, the product of selfing? 
McAdams's answer to this question is that traits, origi- 
nally decontextualized, may become "owned" by the 
self as a result of the selfing process. Along these lines, 
general traits may become incorporated into the self as 
personalized and conditionalized features so that they 
become contextualized. 
However, this processing part of the model leaves a 
central question unanswered: How can a trait, as a 
potential candidate for the self, become a real part of 
the self? In addressing this question, explicit attention 
should be given to the processing of traits from the 
moment a particular trait is selected for inclusion in the 
self to the storing of the trait as an actually owned part 
of the self. Although the model acknowledges the agen- 
tic features of the self, in terms of a selfing process, it 
does not clarify how the processing goes from decon- 
textualized traits to contextualized self components. 
Imagoes As Voiced Characters 
The problem of the contextualization of traits has my 
greatest interest, because in our research (Hermans, 
1996a; Hermans & Kempen, 1993) we have dealt with 
similar problems. Inspired by the Bakhtinian metaphor 
of the "polyphonic novel," we have conceived of traits 
as "voiced characters" that may entertain mutual dia- 
logical relationships. Using a self-confrontation 
method, we invited participants to select opposite trait 
pairs (comparable with Kelly's personal constructs) 
that play a major role in their everyday lives (e.g., open 
vs. closed). Each trait was then defined as a relatively 
autonomous character (subself) in one's life. The par- 
ticipant was invited to formulate a variety of personal 
meaning units (valuations in our terms) referring to 
past, present, and future. This was done apart from the 
position of "I as an open person" and from the position 
of "I as a closed person," and this resulted in two 
valuation systems, one associated with the open char- 
acter and another associated with the closed character. 
We followed the characters over time and found not 
only apparent contradictions between the personal con- 
tent associated with the traits, but also clear instances 
of dominance reversal over time (e.g., the closed char- 
acter that was initially less dominant than the open 
character becomes eventually more dominant). 
The rationale behind this research strategy is that 
traits are or may become highly personal and contextu- 
alized when, as voiced characters, they tell about their 
personal meaning units. From this point of view, 
McAdams's notion of "imago," which he defines as "an 
idealized personification of the self that functions as a 
main character in narrative," is a highly relevant one. If 
conceived as voiced, the imago would have the capacity 
to tell, as a subself, a story filled with personalized and 
contextualized meaning units. In McAdams's model, 
traits conceived as voiced imagoes could tell their own 
stories that have their specific narrative tone, imagery, 
themes, ideological settings, and nuclear episodes. To 
sum up, voicing the concept of imago would allow a 
conceptual bridge for contextualizing trait categories. 
(For an extensive treatment of voicing the self, see 
Hermans, l996b.) 
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Integration: 
An Intrinsic Feature of Story? 
On Level 3 of the proposed model, we find two 
notions that seem to be treated as two sides of a coin: 
(a) the unity of the self and (b) the construction of a life 
story. The combination of these notions, and their sig- 
nificance for the modern self, is well expressed in this 
passage: 
Level 3 presents personality concepts that are espe- 
cially derivative of adult life in modem societies. In 
modernity, a full description of adult personality com- 
monly requires a consideration of the extent to which 
a human life expresses unity and purpose, the hall- 
marks of identity for the reflexive project of the mod- 
ern self. At Level 3, then, reside the psychosocial 
constructions that constitute identity. In the modem 
world, such constructions assume the form of stories 
of the self--internalized and evolving life stories that 
integrate the reconstructed past, perceived present, and 
anticipated future. 
As this and other passages suggest, the notion of 
story implies the unity and integration of the self. To 
what extent is this implication warranted? 
McAdams is well aware of the possibility that people 
offer different stories about themselves in different 
contexts. Referring to the work of Goffman (1959) and 
Hogan (1987:), he points to the demand characteristics 
of everyday life requiring that people operate in strate- 
gic ways to manage the impressions of others, seeking 
status and acceptance in their self-defining groups: 
'Therefore, the story I tell you about myself on a first 
date may be very different from the one I tell at the 
office the next day or the one I tell my therapist next 
week." He even admits that a person may tell more than 
one life story or that "the overall life story itself may 
consist of a collection of rather disconnected stories 
about the self." His answer to these possibilities is that 
"the adult selfing process seems to seek out opportuni- 
ties for integrating different autobiographical accounts 
into a narrated whole, aiming to construct a Me that 
exhibits a modicum of unity, coherence, and purpose." 
Indeed, there is much evidence in the psychological 
literature that people are able to tell disconnected sto- 
ries. A well-known example is the famous case study 
of Eve White and Eve Black (Thigpen & Cleckley, 
1954), two ch,aracters, within the same person, that were 
each able to tell a separate story about themselves, but 
were not able to communicate with each other in a direct 
way. Instead, the one character could only talk about 
the other in a rather objectifying way (consistently 
speaking about "she"). In our own research with clients 
in counseling and psychotherapy (Hermans & Her- 
mansJansen, 1995), we have also found that people, 
both those with dysfunctions and those without dys- 
functions, may tell life stories showing a considerable 
amount of unity and consistency within a particular 
subself, but at the same time exposing many inconsis- 
tencies between different subselves. 
What is the theoretical implication of the existence 
of disconnected stories within one person? When peo- 
ple tell life stories with quite unrelated components, at 
what level does the concept of story belong in the 
proposed model? A person may tell a multiplicity of 
stories, in the same way that he or she may tell about a 
multiplicity of personal concerns or tasks. At what level 
should this multiplicity be placed? It is McAdams's 
position that the synthesis and unity of the self is on 
Level 3. His supposition is, moreover, that the life story 
has so much integrative potential that it should also be 
placed, for that reason, on Level 3. There is, however, 
a counterargument to this combining the concepts of 
integration and life story on Level 3. When stories may 
be as disconnected as concerns, tasks, and goals, then 
the notion of story itself should, in my view, be added 
to Level 2 and not to Level 3. The notion of integration, 
the synthetic function of selfing, has its proper place on 
Level 3, in accordance with McAdams's view. It is this 
synthetic function that integrates not only diversified 
tasks, concerns, and goals, but also the multiplicity of 
stories that results from the great variation of positions 
corresponding with changes in time, place, and role. 
There is no theoretical necessity for binding synthesis 
exclusively to story, because a story has no more or less 
integrative power than a goal or a task. McAdams refers 
to Loevinger's (1976) theory of ego development as an 
example of the synthetic function of the ego. In this 
theory, the synthetic quality of the process of selfing is 
on the highest levels of ego development, but it is not 
exclusively defined in narrative terms. 
The Distinction Among Prenarrative, 
Narrative, and Postnarrative Eras 
From a developmental view, McAdams distin- 
guishes between prenarrative, narrative, and postnarra- 
tive eras in life. The prenarrative era covers infancy, 
childhood, and early adolescence. The narrative era 
runs from some point in adolescence or young adult- 
hood when the individual begins to create a self-defin- 
ing life story through most, if not all, of adulthood. The 
postnarrative era occurs synonymously with Erikson's 
(1963) stage of ego-integrity versus despair. 
In the postnarrative era, McAdams adds, the elderly 
person looks on his or her life as something that has 
been reviewed or may now be reviewed as a near-fin- 
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ished product, "a complete story that may be accepted 
(integrity) or rejected (despair) but which can no longer 
be substantially changed." In my view, there are two 
reasons why I have doubts about this qualification and 
delineation of a postnarrative era, one of a theoretical 
and another of an empirical nature. 
First, McAdams introduces a particular criterion for 
making the distinction between the narrative and post- 
narrative era: The final era is postnarrative because it 
can no longer be substantially changed. In his previous 
argument, however, the essential defining feature of a 
life narrative is its integrative or synthesizing function. 
If we take the latter criterion as the essential one, then 
the era in which the person is doing a large amount of 
integrative work-that is, in Erikson's stage of ego 
integrity versus despair-should be a narrative era par 
excellence. In this case there would not be much reason 
to define late adulthood as posmarrative. 
Second, there are empirical reasons for considering 
late adulthood as aperiod in which the self is confronted 
with many changes that require a continued organiza- 
tion and reorganization of one's life narrative. Kasten- 
baum (1977), for example, has emphasized that death 
is particularly influential in the lives of elderly people. 
The longer one lives, the greater the number of intimate 
companions one outlives. This may even reawaken 
anxieties about separation and loss that have been with 
the individual since early childhood. The elderly are in 
particular jeopardy, because they are likely to experi- 
ence a greater number of bereavements. Before they 
have been able to "work through" the death of a loved 
person, another may die. Under these circumstances, 
Kastenbaum (1969) wrote of "bereavement overload" 
(P. 48). 
Moreover, late adulthood, at least in our culture, can 
be marked by a combination of "role loss" and "object 
loss." The former is characterized by a disruption of a 
functional relationship in society and the latter by the 
falling away of significant others (Averill, 1968). When 
people are losing significant others and are not able, as 
in earlier times, to find meaningful compensation in 
work or other societal activities, their self-system is 
seriously threatened by the risk of depression. Changes 
of this kind are quite typical of late adulthood and 
require a continuous reorganization of one's life narra- 
tive. Taking the theoretical and the empirical argument 
together, I believe that there is reason enough to con- 
sider late adulthood, from a narrative point of view, as 
an era in which significant life events continue to chal- 
lenge the integrative capacities of the self. (Note that I 
have restricted my discussion to the postnarrative era; 
I do not exclude that a similar analysis could be made 
of the prenarrative era.) 
Conclusion 
In summary, I consider McAdarns's multilevel ap- 
proach as representing the beginning of a new era in 
psychology in which centripetal forces are evoked as a 
reaction to the preceding era in which centrifugal forces 
were dominant. The proposed model is comprehen- 
sive enough to offer a broad theoretical view and is, 
at the same time, sufficiently sensitive and flexible 
to incorporate a diversity of research findings on 
specific psychological constructs. In my analysis I 
have concentrated on three issues that may require a 
further articulation or revision of the model: the 
combination of contextualized and noncontextual- 
ized elements, the integrative function of story, and 
the distinction between narrative and postnarrative 
eras in human lives. 
Note 
Hubert J. M. Hermans, Department of Clinical Psy- 
chology and Personality, University of Nijmegen, P.O. 
Box 9104,6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
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